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±‘1 INETEEN SIXTY-SEVEN was the seventh con-
secutive year of economic expansion. Real product
rose about 3 per cent from the end of 1966 to the end
of 1967, compared with 4 per cent in the previous year.
During the recovery and expansion from early 1961
to late 1965, production rose at an average 6 per cent
per year. The growth of production, however, was un-
even during 1967, giving rise to a more than normal
concern over the course of the economy.
An examination of public statements made as the
year 1967 unfolded demonstrates the changing eco-
nomic climate. As the year began, activity was begin-
ning to falter, and there was pessimism about the out-
look. In the December 1966 issue of this Review the
outlook for 1967 was evaluated as: “At year-end it
appears that the combination of monetary and fiscal
developments may not have to be so restrictive in the
coming year as it has been since the spring of 1966.
Total demands for goods and services have probably
slowed, and a further reduction might cause an un-
warranted contraction of employment and real prod-
uct.”
By spring industrial production had declined with
inventories remaining at undesirably high levels, and
many feared that 1967 would be a year of recession.
In the April issue of this Review the question of “Eco-
nomic Plateau or Downturn?” was examined with the
conclusion that “this question cannot be conclusively
settled atthis time (early April)
Both monetary and fiscal actions were very expan-
sionary in the winter and spring, and the outlook
brightened quickly. By late May, Darryl Francis,
President of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, noted
that economic activity was responding to the stimulus.1
Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the President’s Council
‘The September Federal Reserve Bulletin, states on page 1552
that at the May 23 meeting of the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee, “Mr. Francis expressed the view that monetary policy
had been highly stimulative thus far in 1967, that fiscal policy
was providing an increasing stimulus, and the economy was
respoading relatively quickly. On the grounds that a marked
increase in demands for goods and services was likely later in
the year and that monetary policy actions had their main
effects after some time lag, he thought some firming in the
money market should be sought now to guard against the
development later of excessive demands and associated infla-
tionary pressures.”
of Economic Advisers, testified.at the Joint Economic
Committee on June 27 that “Three months ago, there
were grounds for uncertainty about the need for a tax
increase, but now those uncertainties have been elim-
inated. There is no longer any danger of recession,
and there is no escape from the responsibility of im-
posing additional fiscal restraint.”
During the summer and fall, economic activity ac-
celerated rapidly, and the remaining fears of recession
were gradually replaced by concern over excessive
spending and inflation. A survey in August by the
National Association of Business Economists revealed
that most members felt that inflation would be the
nation’s greatest economic problem in the coming
year. Chairman Martin, of the Board of Governors,
testified to the House Ways and Means Committee on
November 29, that “Inflation is no longer just a threat,
it is a reality. Its pervasive effects are now spreading
through many aspects of our economic life. The ad-
vance in prices has been rapid and widespread. Wage
increases continue to be far in excess of productivity
gains.”
To provide perspective for the economic problems
of 1968, the following article; 1) examines economic
events leading up to 1967; 2) traces the pause in the
winter and spring; 3) discusses some of the restrain-
ing forces on economic activity in this period; 4) out-
lines the rapid economic expansion during the sum-
mer and fall; 5) reviews the underlying forces bring-
ing about the acceleration; 6) examines the U.S. bal-
ance of payments with other nations, and 7) ends
with a few conclusions bearing upon the problems of
the immediate future.
The review of the year stresses the roles of mone-
tary and fiscal actions of the Government. Much of
the monetary analysis is based on one major assump-
tion; namely, that the amount of money supplied rela-
tive to people’s desires to hold money as an asset
causes changes in spending (see pages 4 and 5, Money
in a Modern Quantity Theory Framework). The im-
pact of fiscal actions is assumed to be best measured by
changes in the high-employment budget.2 Other views
2
For a discussion of the high-employment budget concept, see
“Estimates of High-Employment Budget; 1947-1967.” by
Keith Carbon in the June 1967 issue of this Review.
Page 2of the nature of monetary and fiscal influence may
have as much explanatory value, but no attempt is
made here to evaluate alternative theories.
Background
The current economic expansion began in early 1961
and is the longest period of continuous economic
growth in the history of the nation. In retrospect, it
appears that much progress has been made in eco-
nomic stabilization, though recessions were narrowly
missed in late 1962 and early 1967, and excessive de-
mands and inflation developedin 1965, 1966, and again
in 1967
From early 1961 to the end of 1964, total spend-
ing on goods and services rose at a 7 per cent annual
rate. Except for a short period of hesitation in late 1962
this was a period of steady economic expansion. Real
output increased at a 5.4 per cent rate, which was
faster than the estimated 4 per cent rate of growth in
productive capacity. As a result, unemployment was
reduced from about 7 per cent of the labor force in
early 1961 to less than 5 per cent in late 1964, and in-
dustrial plant utilization rose from 75 per cent to 86
per cent of capacity. These gains were accomplished
in an orderly fashion without greatfrictions, shortages,
or imbalances, and the trend of prices did not deviate
substantially from a 1.5 per cent up~vardtrend rate.
Major tools of economic stabilization were moderate-
ly stimulative in this period of balanced economic ex-
pansion. Growth in the money stock of the nation
was at a 2.7 per cent annual rate from mid-1960 to
mid-1964, compared with an average 2per cent rate in
the previous decade. The influence of fiscal actions on
the economy, as measured by the high-employment
budget, moved toward ease. The surplus, which was
about $15 billion in 1960, declined to about $6 billion
in 1964 as expenditures rose and tax rates were re-
duced.
From late 1964 to early 1966, economic activity
expanded rapidly. This period was marked by the ac-
celeration of military purchases for Vietnam. Total
spending on goods and services rose at a 10 per cent
annual rate. Most of the increase in demand was
matched by a 7.7 per cent rate of gain in real output.
The rapid expansion in output reduced unemployment
from about 5 per cent to less than 4 per cent of the
labor force and increased industrial plant utilization
from 86 per cent to over 90 per cent of capacity. Over-
all prices rose at a 2 per cent annual rate from late
1964 to early 1966, but considering the rise in total
demand, the rate of inflation was less than might have
been expected.
Fiscal and monetary actions were very expansionary
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in the 1964 to early 1966 period. The Federal high-
employment budget was stimulative; it moved from a
surplus of $6 billion in 1964 to a near balance in early
1966. Expenditure programs for both defense and wel-
fare were increased and certain excise tax rates were
cut in 1965. Demands for credit to finance the build-
up in war materials became intense. Interest rates rose;
yields on highest-grade corporate bonds went up from
4.40 per cent in late 1964 to about 5.00 per cent in the
spring of 1966.
The monetary authorities provided reserves tomem-
ber banks in order to avoid a sharp tightening in credit
conditions in response to the strong credit demands.
The reserves provided for a rapid expansion in com-
mercial bank credit. This, in turn, caused the growth
of money to accelerate from the 2.7 per cent rate in
the mid-1960 to mid-1964 period to a 4 per cent rate
from mid-1964 to the spring of 1965, and further to a 6
per cent rate to the spring of 1966. The acceleration in
Federal Budget lnfluence
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HERE has been considerable discussion in newspapers,
magazines, and professional journals concerning the ef-
fectivenessof various tools of stabilization policy. Oftenthe
debate is concerned with the influence of fiscal policy
versus monetary policy, or with whether monetary actions
are measured better by changes in the money supply or in
interest rates. It is not usually pointed out that alternative
assumptions about the role of money in economic develop-
mentsare basic to each of these arguments. This note dis-
cusses one commonly-held theory of the role of changes in
money as an economic stabilization measure. This theory
is referred to as the “modem quantity theory of money.”
Central to the theory is the basic economic principle
that prices and quantities are determined in individual
markets by forces of demand and supply. It is postulated
that the demand for money by spending units is similar to
their demands for other assets. Individuals allocate wealth
among all assets, including money, by comparing the bene-
fits accruing to them in the form of services and income
from each asset and their current prices.’ If there is a
discrepancy between desired and actual holdings of any
asset (including money balances), the discrepancy is closed
by making purchases or sales. These actions change the
prices and desired holdings of other assets and in turn set
off adjustments by other asset holders. In this way changes
in the demand for or the supply of one asset influence
prices and quantities held of many other assets.
The Demand For Money
Money can be used in several ways. First, it can be
exchanged for present consumption goods which add
directly to one’s well-being. Second, it can be exchanged
for real or financial assets in the expectation of receiving
future income, in the fonn of interest, dividends, or capital
gains. Third, money can be held as an asset which renders
distinct services in the form of reduced transaction costs
and the opportunity to acquire goods or earning assets in
exchange for money. Given more dollars, an individual al-
locates them among the three uses in such a way that the
benefits from the marginal dollar put to each use is equal
to the benefits from the marginal dollar used in each of
the other two ways.
The reader should be aware of some basic concepts and
terminology regarding references tothe demand for money.
The demand for money refers to the demand on the part
of individuals and businesses to hold an amount of money
(usually defined as private demand deposits plus currency)
under different circumstances. The demand to borrow
funds to spend is not what is meant by the demand for
money. Confusion between the demand for credit and the
demand for money to hold often leads to misinterpreta-
tion of the role of interest rates and money in economic
analyses.
Another basic concept is the distinction between the
demand for money and an amount of money demanded.
The demand for money refers to a schedule of different
amounts of money desired to be held or demanded at each
level of interest rates.2 A change in the quantity oramount
of money demanded refers to a movement along a demand
schedule with respect to interest rates due to changing
supply conditions. A change in the demand for money
refers to a shift in the demand schedule such that a greater
or smaller amount of money is demanded at each level of
interest rates?
Influence of Interest Rates on the
Demand For Money
Spending units allocate a given amount of wealth among
various combinations of money, assets intended for im-
mediate consumption, and real and financial assets which
earn interest or render services over time. Instead of hold-
ing money, one could have more goods for consumption
purposes or hold more financial and real assets which earn
interest. Postponed consumption and foregone interest are
the costs of holding money. These foregone opportunity
costs are called the “price” of holding money. At given
levels of income and wealth an individual would desire to
hold less money (and thus more of other assets) at a higher
rate of interest than at a lower rate because the price of
“consuming” the services rendered by money would be
higher; that is, the interest he would forego by holding
money is greater.
Influence of Income, Wealth, and Prices
on the Demand For Money
The amount of money an individual desires to hold at
any point in time depends to a large extent on his income
and wealth. Individuals have different preferences and
consequently hold different amounts of money, even when
they have the same income and wealth. However, the same
person usually wants to hold more money when his income
or real wealth is greater than when it is smaller. Similarly,
the greater the income or real wealth of an economy, the
greater the total demand for money.
One effect of price level changes on the demand for
money is that when the level of prices increases, one’s
nominal wealth increases. The effect of this is that, given
2A schedule is a list of alternatives; for example, if the rate of
interest is 5 per cent, spending units may desire to hold $135
billion, hut if the rate of interest is 4 per cent, they may
desire to hold $140 billion.
m
kn increase in demand is a shift in the schedule such that at
a 5 per cent interest rate, spending units may desire to bold
-$137billion instead of $135 billion,
Money in a Modern Quantity Theory Framework
‘Underlying the desire to hold all assets are the benefits or
services derived from such holdings. The benefits received from
some assets such as food result in its immediate destmction;
hence, these assets are acquired in every thne period. Some
other assets such as consumer and producer durables yield
benefits over a much longer asset life and they are acquired
periodically. Finally, financial assets, including money, yield
benefits as long as they are held. Some services may be ac-
quired without holding an asset directly, for example, haircuts,
Page 4interest rates, an individual would desire a larger nominal
balance of money. A dollar will buy less after prices rise,
and in order to maintain the previous “real” quantity of
money as a proportion of other assets one holds, a larger
“nominal” balance is required.
At a time when prices have not increased, but are
likely to increase, the demand for money declines. As
mentioned previously, one cost of holding money is the
consumption postponed by the individual. If the prices of
goods are rising, a given number of dollars will purchase
fewer consumption goods in the future than at present.
Therefore, in a period of rising prices, the cost of holding
money includes both the postponement of consumption
and the reduced amount of consumption at some future
time. For these reasons, expectations of rising prices in-
crease the cost of holding money. As previously stated,
increases in the cost (price) of holding money reduces the
demand for it, and therefore increases the demand for
other assets.
Money Stock and Economic Activity
With given income, interest rates, prices, and services
received from holding real assets, spending units desire to
hold certain amounts of real assets, money and other finan-
cial assets, and to buy goods and services. Over time,
spending units sell their services and commodities produc-
ed and receive compensation in the form of immediate
additions to their stock of money. The amount of money
received in excess of the amount they desire to hold is used
to acquire real and other financial assets and to purchase
consumption goods and services. Thus, changes in the rate
of spending by economic units may be viewed as part of
an adjustment process which tends to close the discrepancy
between desired and actual money balances. These ad-
justments help to bring about another part of the process.
Commodity prices and yields on financial and real assets
change as individuals and businesses speed up or slow
down the rate at which they pay out the existing amount
of money.
Most assets are produced in response to changes in their
prices; hence, changes in demand call forth changes in the
amount supplied. By contrast, changes in the money stock
in the short run are essentially independent of factors
influencing the demand for money. Several studies have
shown that changes in the money stock are little influenced
by such factors as changes in income, commodity prices,
and interest rates.4 The basicdeterminant of changes in the
actual stock of money is the rate at which reserves and
currency are supplied to the banking system and to the
public. Federal Reserve open-market transactions are a
major factor affecting reserves, and are therefore a potential
source of discrepancy between actual and desired money
balances.
A Federal Reserve open-market purchase leads to the
following sequence of events. First, Government security
dealers receive demand deposits in exchange for Govern-
ment securities; higher prices (lower interest rates) on the
securities acquired induces the dealers to make the ex-
change. But in most instances, dealers do not desire to
hold the additional demand deposit. In the normal course
4 of these studies are discussed by Leonall C. Andersen in
“Three Approaches to Money Stock Determination, this
Review, October 1967.
of their business they rebuild their inventory of securities
or repay debt, and as a result, money is passed on to other
sellers of securities. These adjustments by dealers spread
the new balances throughout the country very rapidly.
Prices on securities (interest yields) change until a new
equilibrium is reached in the securities market
Second, as a result of an open-market purchase, com-
mercial banks receive reserves, which are nonearning
assets. As with any economic unit, banks have a demand
for cash, for income earning financial assets, and for real
assets. With given yields on various assets and with a large
injection of new reserves, banks will have more reserves
than desired. This discrepancy will be eliminated by banks
exchanging demand deposits for financial assets (loans and
investments). Spending units are willing to sell securities
to banks (or borrow) as long as the interest rate charged
by banks is less than the expected yields from hiring labor
services and from other assets. These spending units, in
turn, exchange the demand deposits received for additional
services of labor, for goods and services, and for real and
other financial assets.
In this manner other spending units come to receive
additions to money balances in excess of desired amounts.
They change their rate of spending to eliminate this dis-
crepancy. Since the money stock is little affected by de-
mand forces, spending does not destroy the money bal-
ances, but merely passes them to someone else. The process
continues until new levels of income, prices, interest rates,
and so forth, are reached and spending units desire to hold
the existing stock of money.
Summary- and Conclu.sion
Growth in the output and wealth of a country is deter-
mined primarily by growth in population and technology,
together with people’s time preferences and attitudes
toward uncertainty. However, total production may deviate
from its long-run trend as a result of any one of anumber
of disturbances. An outside influence which changes the
prices and quantities of some assets initiates a chain of
adjustments in the prices and quantities of other assets in
the direction of re-establishing an equilibrium. A discre-
tionary change in the money supply initiated by monetary
authorities is such an influence.
Among all assets, money is considered unique because
of the services it renders and because of the control which
monetary authorities can exercise over it. The demand for
money in the short-run is little affected by those factors
which determine the supply. Therefore, if the stock of
money is increased at a rate which deviates from growth
in its demand, the resulting discrepancy will cause a chain
of adjustments involving all other assets. These adjustments
are observed in the form of changes in spending (quanti-
ties acquired of consumption goods and services, real as-
sets, and financial assets), and of changes in prices (in-
cluding interest rates).
Growth in the money stock can serve as an indicator of
the thrust of monetary actions on economic activity, but it
need not be a source of disturbance to an economy since
its growth can be controlled. Money is not the only possible
indicator of monetary actions, and it is certainly not the
only potential source of disturbance to stable growth
LEONALL C. ANDERSEN
JERRY L. JORDAN
Page 5monetary growth was probably very expansionary,
since a faster rise in the money supply than in the
desire to hold money as an asset causes spending to
rise,
From early 1960 to late 1960, the rate of growth in
total spending slowed. From the first to the fourth
quarter, spending went up at a 6,7 per cent annual
rate, compared with the 10 per cent rate from late
1964 to early 1966. Relative to the ability of the econ-
omy to produce as it approached capacity, however,
total demand remained as excessive in this period as it
had in the previous period. The upward climb in over-
all prices rose from the 2 per cent rate in the earlier
period to a S per centrate.
Early in 1966 output reached virtual capacity, and
could only grow as the stock of capital, labor, and
other resources grew. While price increases acceler-
ated, some prices were inflexible in the short-run, and
the strong demands caused shortages to develop. These
shortages became a restraining force on total spending,
since many contracts could not be completed or were
delayed because key parts were not available. Real
output, which had been rising at a 7.7 per cent pace
from late 1964 to early 1966, slowed to a 3.8 per cent
rate from early to late 1966.
The slowdo~vnin aggregate spending in 1966, how-
ever, cannot be fully explained by capacity limita-
tions. From the first to the second quarter growth in
consumer purchases declined sharply. Special factors,
such as concern about automobile ~cifety and expecta-
tions of improved new models, caused some potential
Monetary restraint was probably a fac-
tor in the slower growth in spending in
late 1966. From April 1966 to January
1967, thcre was little change in the mon-
ey supply—a very restrictive monetary
action compared with the 6 per cent in-
crease in money in the previous twelve
!~
months. Through the summer of 1966 the upward
pressure on spending from the earlier monetary expan-
sion probably continued.
Demands for credit accompanYing the economic ex-
pansion and rising price expectations in the summer
of 1966 were intense, while the supply of funds avail-
able to lend was reduced by the slower rate of growth
of bank credit and money. Interest rates, which are the
equilibrator of the demand and supply of funds, rose
markedly, culminating in the so-called August-Septem-
ber “crunch.” Interest rate laws and other institutional
rigidities interfered with the free market process, caus-
ing some credit flows to he cut off or reversed despite
borrower willingness to pay competitive rates, ,~sa
result, pressures were focused heavily on a few eco-
nomic sectors.
By the fall of 1966, however, income gro~vthhad in-
creased the demand for money as an asset relative to
the money stock, producing a restraint on spending.
Some spending units began to reduce outlays to con-
serve cash and revised their expectations downward,
and credit demands tapered off. Interest rates, after
reaching a peak in the early fall, declined until early
1967, Lower rates gave an impression of an easier
monetary situation despite continued slow growth in
the money stock. Monetary actions usually have little
effect on Federal Government spending, and they ap-
parently had little immediate effect on the rate of in-
ventory accumulation (since much of itmay have been
involuntary). Final purchases by the private sector
(gross national product less Federal Government out-
lays and net purchases of inventories), which after
gro\ving at about a 10 per cent rate from late 1964 to








customers to postpone buying. Although overall fiscal
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Page 6first to third quarters of 1966, slowed further to a 2.8
per cent growth rate in the final quarter of 1966.
The marked slowing in the growth of final spending
by consumers and businesses during 1986 was partially
offset by accelerations in Government spending and by
some, apparently undesired, increases in business in-
ventories. Inventories, which had risen at a $7 billion
annual rate in the 1962-1965 period, went up at a $12
billion rate in the first three quarters of 1966 and at
an $18.5 billion ratein the final quarter.
Economic Parthe Winter and Spring
The hesitation in economic activity that began in
late 1986 became more pronounced in early 1967. Total
spending and production slowed considerably through
the winter and spring, and some sectors of the econ-
omy experienced declines. Total outlays for goods
and services, which rose at a 10 per cent annual rate
from late 1964 to early 1968 and at a 6.7 per cent pace
during most of 1966, went up at a 8.4 per cent rate in
the first half of 1967. Cutbacks in the growth of real
production were even sharper, declining from a 77
per cent annual rate from late 1964 to early 1966, to a
8.8 per cent pace during most of 1966, and to a 1.1 per
cent rate in the first half of 1967.
Government purchases of goods and services con-
tinued to grow in early 1967, but private spending was
little changed on balance, remaining at about the $600
billion annual rate. In the first halfof the year, Govern-
ment spending went up at a 17 per cent annual rate
after rising 14 per cent in 1966, 10 per cent in 1965,
and at an average 4 per cent rate in 1968 and 1964.
Greatest gains were in defense expenditures, but
purchases for nondefense programs of the Federal
Government and spending by state and local govern-
ments also expanded.
Retail sales rose at about a 2 per cent rate from the
early fall of 1966 to the late spring of 1967 after ad-
vancing 8 per cent in the previous year. Fewer auto-
mobiles, appliances, television sets, and other durable
goods were sold in the spring of 1967 than in the previ-
ous fall. Purchases of nondurable goods as well as
consumer services, however, continued to rise. Saving
rose from 6 per cent of personal income after taxes in
1966 to 7 per cent in the first half of 1967
Business firms curtailed their spending sharply. The
biggest cutbacks were made in inventory accumulation,
from an $18.5 billion annual rate in late 1966 to a
$0.5 billion rate in the second quarter. Nevertheless,
inventories apparently remained above desired levels
in relation to sales through the first half. Outlays for
machine tools and other producers’ durable equipment
were at about the same level in the late spring of 1967
Industrial Production
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as in the fourth quarter of 1966, while purchases of
plants, office buildings, and other nonresidential struc-
tures declined slightly
The relatively high level of inventories and the
slower growth in spending in the winter and spring
led to cutbacks in production. Real output of all goods
and services changed little from late 1966 to the spring
of 1967, after growing at a 4 per cent trend rate from
1957 to 1966. Industrial production declined at a 8.6
per cent annual rate from October 1966 to June 1967,
after going up at a 5 per cent trend rate in the 1957-
1966 period. Production for defense continued to ex-
pand, but output of civilian commodities was severely
trimmed, Construction expenditures, which had de-
clined from a $77 billion annual rate in early 1966 to a
$72 billion rate at year end, changed little to the spring
of 1967.
Reflecting the decline in industrial production, un-
used capacity expanded. Employment in May 1967
was at about the level of the previous fall, and unem-
ployment remained relatively low as businesses at-
tempted to hoard labor, and they made adjustments
by reducing the length of the workweek. By late spring
about 85 per cent of industrial capacity was being
utilized, down from about 90 per cent six months
earlier
Despite the pause in economic activity, inflationary
pressures remained strong. Overall prices increased
at a 2.8 per cent annual rate in the first half of 1967,
following the 8 per cent rate in the previous three
quarters. Much of the slowing reflected a changed
supply situation in agricultural products, bringing
about a decline in quotations for farm products, pro-
cessed foods, and feeds.
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Price markups in the spring oF 1967, ~~‘lu’,i overall
demand for goods and services was relatively mild,
reflected both the strong demand for military items
and “cost-push” forces generated by earlier excessive
total demand. Some prices, such as union wages and
those set in other contracts, were relatively inflexible
during earlier periods of excessive demands but moved
up later at times of renegotiation. Other price adjust-
ments had been retarded in 1966 by the guide posts.
As these wages and prices worked up in late 1966 and
early 1967, the increased production costs added to
the inflationary pressures.
Of the two major tools of the Government for in-
fluencing the pace of economic activity, one was a
stimulative force and the other was a restraining force
in early 1967. Fiscal actions provided a strong upward
thrust to spending; in fact, spending by Government
(Federal, state and local) accounted for the entire
increase in total spending. These outlays, through the
“multiplier,” probably had a stimulative effect on
consumer and business expenditures. Monetary devel-
opments, on the other hand, probably operating with
a lag, were a dampening force on private spending.
The Federal Government’s high-employment budget
was at a $12 billion annual rate of deficit in the first
half of 1967, $8.4 billion more stimulative than in the
previous six months. Most of the greater stimulation
came from more defense spending, but welfare pro-
grams and other outlays of the Government continued
to grow. In contrast, during the Korean and earlier
conflicts, marked increases in war expenditures were
partially offset by reductions in nondefense spending.
Monetary actions from the spring of 1966 to early
1967 had a restrictive influence on spending in early
1967. The money stock of the nation, demand deposits
and currency outside banks, had changed little from
April 1966 to January 1967. The growing trend in in-
come and probably in the desire to hold money as an
asset, combined with the fixed volume of money iii
existence, may have caused consumers and businesses
to take actions designed to build up cash balances. A
household or business could build up its cash only by
spending less on goods, services, and investment than
it received from income or sales of investments. Such
adjustments, which could not add to the total stock of
money, merely caused others to have reduced cash in-
flows, and they, in turn, had to adjust their spending.
Such a process tends to continue until with reduced
flows of income and changes in other economic vari-
ables, desired cash balances equal the stock of mont’v
in existence. After the money supply began to rise
rapidly in the late winter, it probably took several
months before the discrepancy between actual and
desired cash balances was great enough to stimulate
spending by much.
The marked change in the rate of money growth in
the spring of 1966 occurred chiefly in demand deposits.
Deposits of member banks are affected largely by the
‘volume of reserves available to support them (i.e., de-
posits in Reserve Banks and vault cash). This control
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Page 8under current arrangements depends upon the legal
requirement that banks must hold reserves equal, on
average, to about one-seventh of their deposits, and
the Federal Reserve has the power to manage the
volume of these reserves. From the spring of 1965 to
the spring of 1966, total reserves of member banks
rose 4.7 per cent, and from then until early 1967, they
changed little on balance. Some reserves went to sup-
port interbank, Government, and time deposits. Re-
maining reserves available for private demand deposits
increased at a4Sper centrate from the spring of 1965




Sometime during the late spring of 1967, another
marked and sustained change occurred in the pace of
economic activity. Total spending rose at an estimated
9 per cent annual rate in the last half of 1967 after
going up at a 8.4 per cent pace in the first half. Real
output of goods and services, which had changed
little on balance early in the year, expanded at an
estimated 5 per cent annual rate in the last half despite
several major strikes. Reflecting the strength of ag-
gregate demand relative to productive potential, in-
flationary pressures intensified.
The acceleration in total spending since the second
quarter has reflected primarily a turnaround in out-
lays by businesses, but Government and consumer
spending has also grown rapidly. Business inventories,
which changed little in the spring, were being accumu-
lated again in the fall, and the pace of residential con-
struction increased.
Real output of goods and services rose in response to
the greater demands. During the summer industrial
production went up sharply, though in the fall in-
terruptions from strikes caused cutbacks. On balance,
industrial production rose at about a 8 per cent rate
from June to November, following a decline at a 8.6
per cent rate from October 1966 to June. Construction
expenditures increased at an 8 per cent annual rate
from the spring to the fall, after remaining virtually
unchanged from the fall of 1966 to the spring of 1967.
Production of all goods and services rose at an esti-
mated 5 per cent rate in the last half of 1967, a pace
slightly faster than the trend growth in productive
capacity.
Despite the increase in production since late spring,
some resources were idle at year-end. The excess
capacity is attributable to work interruptions caused
by strikes and the lagged response of production to
increases in demand. Unemployment amounted to 8.8
per cent of the labor force in the spring and rose to
4.8 per cent in the fall. About 84 per centof productive
capacity was being utilized in the fall, down slightly
from the spring. Average hours worked in manufactur-
ing, however, increased from 40.8 per week in May
and June to 40.7 in October.
Inflationary pressures strengthened in the summer
and fall of 1967, as pressures from rapidly expanding
demands for goods and services were added to the
existing cost-push forces. Overall prices have risen at
an estimated 3.8 per cent annual rate since the second
quarter compared with the 2.8 per centrate of increase
in the first half. ‘Wholesale industrial prices, which
were unchanged from February to July, have since
gone up at a8per centrate,
Expansionary Forces on Economic
Activity Summer and Fall
Both fiscal and monetary developments were very
stimulative in the summer and fall of 1967. The sharp-
est change has been in monetary factors, Fiscal actions,
which were already the most stimulative since World
War II, may have become slightly more expansive.
The Government’s high-employment deficit changed
little, from about a $12 billion rate in the first half of
1967 to an estimated $13 billion rate in the second half.
It does not appear that the minor move to a greater
deficit since mid-year has been primarily responsible
for the marked upturn in total demand and production.
The marked move from a $3 billion annual rate of
deficit in the last half of 1966 to the $12 billion rate in
the first half of 1967 might have been effective with a
lag.
Monetary expansion after January of this year may
have been a major force contributing to the more rapid
growth in total spending after the spring. Net pur-
chases of securities by the System have been relatively
large since early in the year, and these purchases have
added directly to member bank reserves. In early
March, the System lowered reserve requirements from
4 per cent to 3 per cent on savings deposits and on
the first $5 million of other time deposits. In early
April, the Reserve Banks reduced the discount rate on
borrowed reserves from 4% per cent to 4 per cent, In
late November, following the devaluation of the British
pound, the rate was returned to 4% per cent. As a net
result of these actions, Federal Reserve credit, ad-
justed for changes in reserve requirements, has risen
at a 12 per cent annual rate since January.
Largely because of the pronounced increase in Fed-
eral Reserve credit, total reserves of member banks
(adjusted for the change in reserve requirements) have
Page 9grown at a 10 per cent annual rate since January.
They had not grown at all from April to January.
Reserves available for private demand deposits have
risen at a 7 per cent rate since January in sharp con-
trast to a 2 per cent rate of decline from April 1986 to
January. From 1957 to 1966 these reserves rose at an
average 1.5 per cent per year rate.
With the substantial inflow of reserves, commercial
banks have expanded credit about 12 per cent since
last December. By comparison, bank credit rose at a
1 per cent annual rate in late 1986 and at 7 per cent
per year from 1957 to 1966, Bank loans have increased
about 8 per cent since last December, and investment
holdings have risen about 28 per cent.
Bank deposits have also risen rapidly as both bor-
rowers from banks and sellers of securities to banks
received newly created deposits. The broader concept
of money, which includes allprivately held commercial
bank deposits plus currency held by the public, has
risen at a 12 per cent rate since January, In the prev-
ious nine months, this magnitude increased at a 4 per
cent rate, and from 1957 to 1966 at a 6 per cent rate.
Money, as more commonly defined to include private
demand deposits and currency, has risen at about a 7
per cent annual rate since January. In the previous
nine months it had changed little, and from 1957 to
1966 it grew at an average 2,4 per cent rate. With the
much sharper acceleration in money supply than in
people’s incomes and ‘wealth in 1967, a discrepancy
may have developed between the money supply and
desired money holdings, creating an upward pressure
on spending.
The marked change in the trend of Federal Reserve
credit, bank reserves, and money in early 1967 may
Money Stock
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have been the result of several unusual market devel-
opments. Monetary actions from day to day are direct-
ed primarily at influencing money market conditions.3
At the November 1966 meeting of the Open Market
Committee, it was decided that less monetary restraint
was desirable and that money market conditions should
be eased.4
After November 1966 money market conditions
eased. Net borrowed reserves (borrowings from Re-
serve Banks less excess reserves) fell from $400 million
in October to about zero in late January, interest rates
on three-month Treasury bills declined from 5.80 per
cent to 4M5 per cent, and other market conditions be-
came more comfortable. After the fact, it appears that
the easing of money market conditions reflected
a contraction of credit demands rather than any
action on the part of monetary authorities. The bank-
ing system did not expand and thereby continued to
act as a restrainingforce on spending.
In economic pauses of 1958-54, 1957-58, and 1959-60,
themoney market conditions indicator likewise showed
ease, while monetary growth lagged behind. The fast
shift toward monetary expansion in early 1967 may
have reflected several unusual factors affecting credit
demands and money market rates. The large Federal
deficits bolstered the demand for credit and induced
expectations of large future credit demands. Hence,
rapid expansion in bank reserves, bank credit, and
bank deposits occurred at a higher level of interest
rates than would have been possible in a period of a
more nearly balanced budget. Also, after many busi-
nesses found that during the “crunch” of August-Sep-
tember 1966 short-term credit might not always be
available, they sought in early 1967 to improve their
basic liquidity by borrowing more long-term funds
with a result that the demand for credit by businesses
was abnormally intense, given the current economic
conditions. Further, a large money market bank re-
duced the prime rate on business loans from 8 per cent
to 5% per cent in late January. This action may have
been taken in advance of basic supply and demand
forces, and many other banks did not follow the lead.
Nevertheless, the announcement caused other market
rates to fall temporarily, and then the System, follow-
ing its operating guide of slightly easier market condi-
tions, tended to supply reserves as the basic market
forces reasserted themselves. Consequently, interest
8
See the Annnal Reports of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System for 1966 and earlier years and the
released Policy Entry Records for the first eight months of
1967.
4For a summary of the meeting see the Annual Report of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for 1966,
pages 190-195.
Page 10rates probably declined more sharply than they would
have otherwise.
As a result of these and other developments, money
market conditions in the February through April
period were consistent with a rapid increase in
bank reserves, bank credit, and the stock of money.
These developments had an expansive effect on
economic activity and brought about an upward
revision in price expectations. Credit demands were
stimulated, and by late April capital market interest
rates began rising. The continued rapid monetary
expansion placed further downward pressure on short-
term rates until June, when credit demands became so
intense that short-term interest rates rose despite con-
tinued monetary expansion.
Interest rates went up sharply in late 1967, but in-
dications are that they were not an effective restraint
on borrowing and spending. From late April 1967 to
early December, interest rates on highest-grade cor-
porate bonds rose from 5.10 per cent to 6.14 per cent,
and from June to early December, yields on three-
month Treasury bills svent up from about 3.50 per
cent to 4.95 per cent. In order to he a restraining force
on spending, market interest rates must exceed the
anticipated level of return on real capital adjusted for
price expectations. Meanwhile, rapid monetary ex-
pansion, svhich leads to greater spending and profit
opportunities, causes upward adjustments in the ex-
pected return on capital. Eventually, the greater spend-
ing causes upward revisions in price expectations.
Changing price expectations have probably had a
significant effect on market interest rates. Prices have
been rising faster in recent years than in the early
1980’s, and expectations of future price movements
are probably being revised up\vard. Borrowers are
more willing to seek funds and pay higher rates when
they anticipate repaying in cheaper dollars. Savers
and investors take into consideration the expected pur-
chasing power of funds to be returned.
Expectations of borrowers and lenders cannot be
quantified. The accompanying chart illustrates the
principle, however, by comparing the market rate
with a “real”rate drawnby assuming that expectations
of future price developments are based on price move-
ments in the two previous years. As price increases
have accelerated in recent years, the adjustment for
price expectations has grown, and the spread between
market rates of return and “real” rates of return has
widened, Real interest rates give a much different
picture of the influence of recent market interest rate
developments. Current market interest rates, rather
than being at abnormally high levels, may be lower
in a real sense than in the 1962 to early 1964 period.
Developments in the Balance of
Payments
The U.S. balance of payments in 1967, as in any
year, was greatly affected by movements in total de-
mand in the United States and abroad and in relative
interest rates. In 1967, as in 1966, there \vere also
special conditions that influenced the balance of pay-
ments, including the war in Vietnam and the Arab-
Israeli war.
The Current Account—Imports, reflecting the pattern
of total demand for goods and services in the U.S.,
grew at a 15 per cent rate in the second half of 1966,
then remained unchanged in the first half of 1967.
During the second half of 1967 total demand resumed
the rapid growth rate of 1966- However, imports
lagged somewhat behind, showing only a modest
increase in the lasthalf of the year.
Estimated income in the rest of the world grew at
a relatively slow rate in the last half of 1966 due, in
part, to some weakness in several Western European
countries.5 U.S. exports correspondingly increased at a
8 per cent annual rate in the second half of 1966, down
is ome of th rest of the world i estimat do nthe basis of
the growth in the imports of the e t of the wor d.
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Page 11from a 9 per cent growth in the first half. In the first
half of 1967 estimated world income accelerated some-
what, and U.S. exports also accelerated. In the second
half exports are estimated to have continued to grow
at a fairly steady rate. As a result of these diverse
movements, the trade accillilit of the U.S. balance of
payments weakened in the second half of 1966, and
improved in the first and second hal’vs of 1967.
U.S. TRADE BALANCE
Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates
Sillions of ool:ors)
Exports Imports Balance
1966 2nd Half 29.6 26.5 3.1
1967 1sf Hall 30.8 26.5 4.3
1967 2nd Half’ 31.5 26.7 4.8
‘ actim .stpcI
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The I L8 per cent devaluation oF the British pound
sterling on November 18 took place too late in the
year to affect the trade picture of 1987. However, it
will have some effect on the trade in 1968, There are
three ways in which this effect canoperate:
(1) The Price Effect. To the extent that British ex-
ports will be cheaper, it will provide an incentive for
Americans to import more from the United Kingdom.
On the other hand, United States exports to the United
Kingdom will be more expensive, which will dis-
courage some British purchases. Thus, the price effect
of the devaluation will be to make our trade surplus
smallerthan it otherwise would havebeen.
(2) The Third Country Effect. The United Kingdom
may be able to undersell the United States in foreign
markets because of the devaluation. This effect is not
expected to be largebecause the United States exports
a different mix of products than the United Kingdom
(largely food products and sophisticated consumer
and producer durables).
(3) The Income Effect. If the United Kingdom can
correct its balanceof payments more quickly as a result
of devaluation, it will be able to engage in stimulative
domestic policies to encourage growth at an earlier
date than would have been possible without devalua-
tion. This rise in the income of the United Kingdom
would encourage exports from the United States.
The Price and Third Country effects will hurt the
U.S. balance of trade. The income effect will help.
What on balance will be the net effect in 1968 of ster-
ling devaluation is impossible to say now.
The non-trade components of the current account
were weaker in 1987 than in 1966. The balance-of-pay-
ments costs of the war in Vietnam are estimated to
have increased $500 to $600 million above the level
for 1966 (from $3.7 billion to about $4.3 billion);
Canadian Expo ‘67 resulted in a bulge in tourist spend-
ing in the second and third quarters of 1987 by as
much as $400 million; finally, the Middle-East crisis
in June triggered a large flow of transfer payments to
Israel. If there is no additional escalation of the Viet-
nam War, it is anticipated that its balance-of-payments
costs will not rise above their present level. The other
large increases in non-trade spending in 1967 will
probably not continue into 1968.
In 1967 the trade balance is estimated to register a
surplus of about $4.6 billion, up from the $3.7 billion
of 1966. In spite of the temporary but heavy bulge in
the non-trade accounts, the current account will also
probably show some improvement in 1967, but it will
be by a more modest $200 to $300 million to around
$5.0 billion surplus.
The Capital Account—Complete data on the U.S.
capital account are available only through the first
half of 1967, which, of necessity, makes a discussion of
this segment of the balance of payments relatively
more incomplete. A major determinant of year-to-year
movements in the capital account are developments in
interest rates, and secondary factors are the volume of
foreign trade and the relative attractiveness of foreign
versus domestic investment. Because of the unusually
sharp fluctuations in the last eighteen months, interest
rates have played an even more important role in de-
termining capital movements than is usually the case.
Although the level of direct investment has increas-
ed during the last two years, the proportion financed
from foreign sources of capital has become larger
Thus, the effect of U.S. direct investment abroad on
the balance of payments has been reduced. This
phenomenon is due not only to rising interest rates in
the United States relative to Europe, but also to the
administration’s voluntary program to correct the bal-
ance-of-payments deficit.
The effect of fluctuations in U.S. interest rates can
be especially observed in the movements of short-term
capital and gyrations in the official settlements measure
of the balanceof payments. The rapid run-up of interest
rates in the third quarter of 1966 attracted a heavy
inflow of capital, especially short-term capital. When
rates started to fall and liquidity positions of banks
eased in the fourth quarter of 1966 and the first quarter
of 1967, the short-term capital inflow was at first re-
duced and then reversed. There was a rebound in
interest rates in June with liquidity positions of banks
tightening. In the third quarter of 1967, short-term
Page 12interest rates continued rising, with a corresponding
squeeze on the liquidity of commercial banks. This
development in the domestic market had the effect of
stopping the outflow of short-term funds in the second
quarter (the net result of a continued outflow in the
early part of the quarter and a sharp reversal to an
inflow in June). The inflow is estimated to have con-
tin nd during the third quarter.
INTEREST RATE SENSITIVITY
OF FOREIGN-HELD DOLLAR BALANCES
Change In
Private Foreign Overall
Average 3-Mos. Holdings of Liquid Balance of Payments
U.S Treasury Bill Rate Dollar Assets’ (Official Settlements)’
(Millions of Dollars)
1966 Ill -~- .45 1.211 -1 405
IV -.“ .17 671 - 198
1967 I .69 - 709 -1,282
II - .85 94 .. 682
III ~ .63 8OCit .f 2
•Not sralon ally adjusted.
-,-‘tim,sit’d
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These sharp fluctuations in foreign private holdings
of liquid dollar assets have been responsible for the
equally sharp fluctuations in the overall balance of
payments, measured on the basis of the official settle-
ments balance.
Overall Balance of Payments—There are two official-
ly accepted measures of the balance of payments. The
differences represent the way the dollar holdings of
foreigners are viewed. The traditional measure of the
balance of payments is the liquidity balance, meas-
ured by the change in the United States gold stock
(and other reserve assets of the United States Govern-
ment) and increases in liquid liabilities to all for-
eigners. Even if foreigners wish to hold increasing
amounts of dollars because of their need for an inter-
national currency, the increases would still be con-
sidered as a part of the deficit.
A newer measure of the U.S. balance of payments is
the official settlements balance. This measure attempts
to make an adjustment for foreign holdings of dollars
which are based on the foreign desire to hold dollars.
The official settlements balance assumes that private
foreigners and international institutions hold dollars
because they want to. They are, in effect, buying the
liquidity services of the dollar just as they could buy
any other services which the United States sells. There-
fore, the official settlements balance considers changes
in private foreign dollar holdings as a capital inflow
rather than as a method of financing the deficit. Only
foreign official holdings of dollar claims on the United
States are considered a method of financing the U.S.
deficit.6
In the year ending September 1967, the official
settlements deficit was $2.2 billion, while the liquidity
deficit was $1.5 billion. This compares with an official
settlements deficit of $0.7 billion, and a liquidity
deficit of $1.2 billion in the year ending September
1966. Both measures of the balance of payments have
deteriorated inthe last year.
Conclusions and Outlook
The year 1967 was the seventh year of continuous
economic expansion, and for that reason may be con-
sidered, another success for economic stabilization.
From the point of view of “fine tuning,” however, the
year was the biggest disappointment since 1960. A
recession was narrowly missed in the earlymonths, per
capita real income was about unchanged in the first
half, and at year-end inflationary forces were strong
and apparently growing.
Stabilization knowledge, tools, and skills have prob-
ably progressed to the point where better results might
have been obtained. To the purist, there is little con-
solation in the knowledgethat, with our Governmental
system of checks and balances, impasses between the
legislative and Administrative branches may develop.
Hence, the budget continued to be an extremely in-
flationary force while a debate raged over whether
the adjustment should be a tax increase or an expendi-
ture cut. Meanwhile, monetary expansion, tolerated
by an effort to secure fiscal restraint, may have con-
tributed to the inflationary forces.7
Developments during 1967 provided tests, but cer-
tainly not conclusive ones, of two issues which have
been debated for years. One is whether fiscal actions
or monetary developments have a stronger influence
on consumer and business spending. From the spring
of 1966 to early 1967, there was monetary restraint but
increasingly expansive fiscal policy. Private spending
hesitated, and apparently only resumed its advance
following a period of renewed monetary expansion.
These developments provide support for the view that
monetary developments, as they were applied, were
6Both the liquidity balance and official settlements balance
treat a decline in the gold and international assets of the U.S.
Government as a method of financing a deficit.
T
See Policy Entry Record for the August 15 meeting of the
Open Market Committee, page 7, reporting “a number of mem-
bers tixpressed the judgment that -- uncertainties about the
outcome with respect to the fiscal program now under active
consideration by Congress militated against a change in mone-
tary policy at present.”
Page 13relatively stronger than fiscal developments.
A second debated issue is whether changes in in-
terest rates or changes in money stock are a better
measure of monetary effect, During the summers of
both 1966 and 1967, market interest rates were at rela-
tively high levels and rising rapidly. After the 1966
period of no growth in money stock, economic activity
slowed; following the 1967 period of rapidly rising
money stock, spending quickened and inflationary
pressuresintensified. These developments provide some
evidence for the view that growth rates in money are
a better practical indicator of the effect of monetary
actions than are interest rates, In theory, one measure
is as good as the other and neither measure alone is
a complete explanation of the effect of monetary ac-
tions on the economy. Money supply, according to
the theory applied in this article, must be related to
money demanded, while market interest rates, accord-
ing to the Keynesian analysis, must be related to the
anticipated rate of return on capital. The test indicates
that in the periods reviewed, growth in the demand
for money was relatively stable and, hence, marked
changes in the growth rate of money supply had a
predictable effect on economic activity. Changes in
market interest rates, however, ~vere difficult to inter-
pret because of changes in the anticipated return on
capital.
Conditions at year-end indicate that stabilization
problems will present a formidable challenge during
the year 1968. Late in 1967, spending is rising twice as
fast as productive resources, prices are increasing in
response to both past and current demands, market
interest rates have risen to the point where many con-
cerns were threatened by legal and institutional rigidi-
ties, balance of payments problems continue, and
both monetary and fiscal influences are more stimula-
tive than at any other time in two decades.
An initial problem in 1968 will probably be to con-
tain excessive demands for goods and services. Less
expansive fiscal and monetary actions may he desirable
for the general welfare even though they do impinge
on some activities more than others. Some have ad-
vocated selective credit controls as alternatives, but
such controls restrain particular activities and also raise
problems of resource allocation, interfere with free-
dom, and are difficult to administer.
Even if a slowdown in spending growth can be
gained within a reasonable period, upward pressures
on prices from past excessive demand (called cost-
push) will probably continue for a period. As a result,
while inflationary expectations are being reduced, the
economy may experience both more price increases
and more unemployment than would be optimal in
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Further, any slowing of the excessive demands could
“snowball” into inadequate demands. If growth in
spending moderates and inflationary expectations re-
cede, equilibrium interest rates are likely to decline,
perhaps sharply. Under such conditions, expansion of
hank reserves, bank credit, and hank deposits might
seem redundant. But, if great care is not taken to con-
tinue monetary expansion in line with the growth in
the demand for money to hold, economic contraction
may develop at a time when interest rates are moving
down,
Insight into the demand for money to hold can be
gained by examining some evidence of its behavior
over recent business cycles.5 The three shaded areas on
the accompanying chart are periods of cyclical decline
in economic activity as selected by the National Bureau
of Economic Research; in other periods there was
economic expansion.
A line illustrating the amount of money demanded
has also been placed on the chart. It was drawn by
assuming that at each cyclical turning point, peak or
trough, the amount of money desired was exactly
equal to the amount supplied (activity at these points
was neither expanding nor contracting and at such
times our hypothesis states that money supplied is
exactly equal to money demanded). In the fall of
1962 and in early 1967, when economic activity reach-
ed a plateau, it was also assumed that money supplied
and demanded were in equilibrium, These turning
points and plateaus were then connected by lines of
uniform rates of change. The slopes of these lines give
approximations of average rates of change of money
demanded over phases of cycles.
Several observations canbe made from an examina-
tion of the chart. First, explanation of all cycles canbe
made by assuming that demand for money to hold
rises at relatively uniform rates, and that a discrepancy
in money demanded and money stock causes a change
in spending. In the chart, money supplied exceeds that
demanded in each period of expansion (consistent
with the hypothesis that increases in spending reflect
attempts by individual spending units to purchase
goods, services, and securities with excess cash).
Similarly, the amount of money supplied is less than
8This analysis is based on a hypothesis that a change in spend’
ing is a process by which money demand is brought into
final equilibrium with money supply. The money supply is
largely determined by Federal Reserve actions. Temporary
equilibria between amount of money demanded and money
supply are accomplished through changes in interest rates and
other relative prices. Changes in cash balances, interest rates,
and other prices affect spending, income, wealth, and expecta-





the amount demanded in each period of recession
(also consistent with the hypothesis).
Second, growth in money demanded has been rel-
atively stable from one cyclical phase to the next,
indicating that the growth rate in desired balances
does not change rapidly. As a result, marked and
sustained changes in the growth rate of the money
supply have generally been associated with cyclical
changes in economic activity.
Third, changes in the growth rates of money de-
manded were usually in the direction of the growth
rates in money supply.° Changes in the amount of
money supplied initially brings about changes in
interest rates and other relative prices; these in turn,
cause changes in spending. Spending affects incomes,
wealth, prices, and expectations; and through these,
the growth rate of money demand. The process con-
tinues until money demand is in final equilibrium with
money supply.
9The spurt in production in early 1960, following the settle-
ment of the major steel strike, may have delayed the cyclical
peak by one to four months. In terms of the hypothesis, the
sudden availability of steel products may have reduced the
demand for money to hold for a period. If the cyclical peak
had occurred any time in the January-April period, there would
have been no exception to the rnle that changes in the growth
rate of money demanded are in the direction of equating








0” Estimated Amount of loney Demanded
A review of the past fifteen years indicates that the
growth rate in money demanded has been increasing.
From 1953 to early 1961, when economic expansion
was interrupted by several recessions, the growth
appears to have ranged from zero to a 1.6 per cent
annual rate. From early 1961 to the fall of 1962, money
demanded rose at a 1.8 per cent rate; from the fall of
1962 to early 1967, money demanded rose at a 3.7 per
cent rate.
Currently, money demanded may be rising in the
3.8 to 5 per cent per year range. Since the amount
demanded tends to adapt to the supply, it probably
is going up faster than the 3.7 per cent rate from 1962
to early 1967. The relative stability of money demand-
ed in the short run indicates that it cannot be rising
faster than at about a 5 per cent rate. Continued in-
creases in the stock of money at rates faster than 5
per cent per year would probably cause unduly large
demands for goods and services while a slower than
a 3.8 per cent rate of money growth, calculated from
January 1967, is apt to cause the expansion in total
demand to be inadequate for a desired level of output.
Movements in the currency component of money
provide a rough guide to the growth rate of the de-
mand for money. Although the supply of demand de-
posits is largely determined by the Federal Reserve,
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